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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - PRESIDENT'S PowER TO REMOVE - Plaintiff
had been appointed to the board of directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority
by the President with the adv:ice and consent of the Senate. The statute creating this public corporation gives the President power to remove any director
who appoints or promotes lower officials on the basis of anything other than
merit.1 Congress is authorized to remove a member of the board by a concurrent resolution of the two houses.2 Plaintiff was summarily removed by the
President and sued to recover his salary for the whole of the prescribed nineyear term of office. Heltt, that the plaintiff, having duties predominantly executive, could be removed by the President without cause. Morgan v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) IIS F. (2d) 990, cert. denied (U.S.
1941) 61 S. Ct. 806 ..
The federal Constitution states that the executive power of the United
States shall be vested in a President 8 who shall appoint officials of the United
States with the advice and consent of the Senate.4 Congress, however, may
vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in courts of law,
or in the heads of departments. 5 Because the Constitution gives him the power
to appoint, and because he must also execute laws of the land, the President,
unless the Constitution otherwise provides, has exclusive power to remove those
officials whom he appointed with the consent of the Senate. This; doctrine was
announced in the celebrated case of Myers v. United States 6 but was restricted
by the holding in the case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States,1 where
the President alone removed a member of the Federal Trade Commission and
the Supreme Court found that such removal was forbidden by the statute creating the office. In that case the statutory restriction on the President's power
was constitutional because the offic.e in question was in its nature quasilegislative and quasi-judicial rather than chiefly executive. Because the
absolute power of removal is based on the theory that the separation of powers
requires that the President alone have control over the executive branch of our
government, the Court decided that where the function of the official was not
purely executive, Congress in creating the office could determine the conditions
of removal. The Court ruled that in the case of officials with purely executive
duties, the President's power to dismiss could not be hampered, but that where
the work was purely quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, Congress could limit
the power. The disposition of cases falling between these extremes was spe48 Stat. L. 63, § 6 (1933), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 831e.
48 Stat. L. 60, § 4(£) (1933), 16 U.S. C. (1934), § 831c (F).
8
Art. II, § 1, "The executive Power shall be vested in a President.•••"
4 Art. II, § 2.
5 Ibid. In these cases Congress may limit the removal power. United States v.
Perkins, II6 U.S. 483, 6 S. Ct. 449 (1886).
6
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926). This case concerned the right of the President to remove a postmaster appointed with the consent
of the Senate for four years. For complete discussion of this decision, see 36 YALE L. J.
390 (1927) and 25 M1cH. L. REv. 280 (1927).
1 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935). Donovan and Irvine, "The President's
Power to Remove Members of Administrative Agencies," 21 CoRN. L. Q. 215 (1936),
is an excellent discussion of the whole field.
1
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cifically left for future judicial determination. 8 Evidently the Court is willing to
resolve the right of Congress to restrict the presidential power by ascertaining
whether the function of the official removed is predominantly executive or
otherwise,9 In the principal case, there were two grounds upon which the decision of the Court might properly be supported. First, as the circuit court suggests, the T.V.A. exercises, if not wholly at least predominantly, executive or
administrative powers, and Congress, therefore, cannot constitutionally limit
the President's right to remove.10 Secondly, even if the plaintiff was not an
administrative official, the wording of the statute itself does not preclude the
President's unassisted dismissal. Although the plaintiff was appointed for a
specified number of years,11 and certain grounds for removal were stated in the
statute, the Supreme Court has always recognized that the President's removal
power exists unless specifically curbed.12 In the statute establishing the T.V.A.
Congress nowhere prohibited the exercise of such power, although the act was
passed after the Myers decision announced the presence of a wide presidential
discretion and before the Humphrey's case had narrowed its scope. The Court's
reluctance to limit the presidential power is not surprising in view of the present
trend of both Congress and the Court to permit presidential control in a wide
degree so that the chief executive may perform effectively his ever-increasing
duties.13 The case, however, is important because it is a forward step in clarifya Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 at 632, 55 S. Ct.
869 (1935), "To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers case, which sustains the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive officers,
and our present decision that such power does not extend to an office such as that here
involved, there shall remain a field of doubt, we leave such. cases as may fall within
it for future consideration and determination as they may arise."
9
Notice the circuit court's reliance in the principal case on the predominance
of the executive. Cf. Donovan and Irvine, "The President's Power to Remove Members of Administrative Agencies," 21 CoRN. L. Q. 215 at 229 (1936): "As to officers
who perform quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions and who also perform executive duties, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress may place upon the President's
power of removal such limitations as are necessary and proper to make it possible for
such officers properly to discharge the independent functions of their office." These
writers, at page 241, note 106, stated that the statute permitted the President to
remove members of the board at will!
10 The board is to co-operate with farm organizations, develop fertilizers, improve plants and operate laboratories. 48 Stat. L. 61, § 5 (1933), 16 U. S. C. {Supp.
193 9), § 8 3 Id. The corporation can exercise the right of eminent domain, purchase
real estate, construct dams, construct power houses and build lines. 48 Stat. L. 60, §
4(i) (1933), 16 U.S. C. {Supp. 1939), § 831c{i). A district attorney was removed
in Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324, 17 S. Ct. 880 {1897); an appraiser, in
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 3II, 23 S. Ct. 535 (1903).
11
48 Stat. L. 59, § 2(b) (1933), 16 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 831a(b).
12
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 31 I at 318, 23 S. Ct. 535 (1903), "The
right of removal • • • would exist as inherent in the power of appointment unless
taken away in plain and unambiguous language." 6 ORE. L. REv. 165 (1927) discusses the opinions of various state courts on this question.
18
The fear of presidential tyranny and the corrupt use of political appointments
where the president has the sole power to remove has always been counterbalanced by
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ing the great number of border-line situations which remained for judicial
interpretation after the Humphrey decision.

Rex B. Martin

the desire to make the President an efficient administrative official. Fairlee, "The
Administrative Powers of the President," 2 MICH. L. REv. 190 at 201 (1903),
states, "Moreover it remains true, as it was argued in 1789, that the power of removal
is indispensable to the President if he is to be held responsible for the administration
and execution of the laws. And in addition to developing the system of political removals, from the power of removal there has been evolved in large measure, the President's effective power of direction and supervision over the entire national administration."

